We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each agent i has a private signal s i that captures her private information, and the valuation function of every agent depends on the entire signal profile, s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). Previous results in economics concentrated on identifying (often stringent) assumptions under which optimal solutions can be attained. The computer science literature provided approximation results for simple singleparameter settings (mostly single item auctions, or matroid feasibility constraints). Both bodies of literature considered only valuations satisfying a technical condition termed single crossing (or variants thereof). Indeed, without imposing assumptions on the valuations, strong impossibility results exist.
In this paper, we consider combinatorial auctions, where each agent has a value for every subset of items, and the goal is to maximize the social welfare, namely the sum of agent valuations for their assigned bundles. As a special case of general social choice settings, the VCG mechanism solves this problem optimally, as long as the values are independent.
There are many settings, however, in which the independence of values is not realistic. If the item being sold has money-making potential or is likely to be resold, the values different agents have may be correlated, or perhaps even common. A classic example is an auction for the right to drill for oil in a certain location [Wilson, 1969] . Importantly, in such settings, agents may have different information about what that value actually is. For example, the value of an oil lease depends on how much oil there actually is, and the different agents may have access to different assessments about this. Consequently, an agent might change her own estimate of the value of the oil lease given access to the information another agent has. Similarly, if an agent had access to the results of a house inspection performed by a different agent, that might change her own estimate of the value of a house that is for sale.
The following model due to Milgrom and Weber [1982] , described here for single-item auctions, has become standard for auction design in such settings. These are known as interdependent value settings (IDV) 1 and are defined as follows:
• Each agent i has a real-valued, private signal s i . The set of signals s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) may be drawn from a (possibly) correlated distribution.
The signals summarize the information available to the agents about the item. For example, when the item to be sold is a house, the signal could capture the results of an inspection and privately collected information about the school district. In the setting of oil drilling rights, the signals could be information that each companies' engineers have about the site based on geologic surveys, etc.
• The value of the item to agent i is a function v i (s) of the signals (or information) of all agents.
A typical example is when v i (s) = s i + β j =i s j , for some β ≤ 1. This type of valuation function captures settings where an agent's value depends both on how much he likes the item (s i ) and on the resale value which is naturally estimated in terms of how much other agents like the item ( j =i s j ) [Myerson, 1981; Klemperer, 1998 ].
In the economics literature, interdependent settings have been studied for about 50 years (with far too many papers to list; for an overview, see [Krishna, 2009] ). Within the theoretical computer science community, interdependent (and correlated) settings have received less attention [Ronen, 2001; Ito and Parkes, 2006; Constantin, Ito, and Parkes, 2007; Klein, Moreno, Parkes, Plakosh, Seuken, and Wallnau, 2008; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos, 2011; Dobzinski, Fu, and Kleinberg, 2011; Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Paes Leme, 2012; Abraham, Athey, Babaioff, and Grubb, 2011; Robu, Parkes, Ito, and Jennings, 2013; Kempe, Syrgkanis, and Tardos, 2013; Che, Kim, and Kojima, 2015; Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016; Li, 2016; Chawla, Fu, and Karlin, 2014; Eden, Feldman, Fiat, and Goldner, 2018 ].
Maximizing Social Welfare
Consider the goal of maximizing social welfare in interdependent settings. Here, a direct revelation mechanism consists of each agent i reporting a bid for their private signal s i , and the auctioneer determining the allocation and payments. (It is assumed that the auctioneer knows the form of the valuation functions v i (·).)
In interdependent settings, it is not possible 2 to design dominant-strategy incentive-compatible auctions, since an agent's value depends on all of the signals, so if, say, agent i misreports his signal, then agent j might win at a price above her value if she reports truthfully. The next strongest equilibrium notion one could hope for is to maximize efficiency in ex-post equilibrium: bidding truthfully is an ex-post equilibrium if an agent does not regret having bid truthfully, given that other agents bid truthfully. 3 In other words, bidding truthfully is a Nash equilibrium for every signal profile.
For single-item auctions, a characterization of ex-post incentive compatibility in the IDV setting is known [Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016] , analogous to Myerson's characterization for the independent private values model. The characterization says that there are payments that yield an ex-post incentive-compatible mechanism if and only if the corresponding allocation rule is monotone in each agent's signal, when all other signals are held fixed. Maximizing efficiency in expost equilibrium is also provably impossible unless the valuation functions v i (s) satisfy a technical condition known as the single-crossing condition [Milgrom and Weber, 1982; d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1982; Maskin, 1992; Ausubel et al., 1999; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Athey, 2001; Bergemann, Shi, and Välimäki, 2009; Chawla et al., 2014; Che et al., 2015; Li, 2016; Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016] . I.e., the influence of agent i's signal on his own value is at least as high as its influence on other agents' values, when all other signals s −i are held fixed 4 . When the single-crossing condition holds, there is a generalization of VCG that maximizes efficiency in ex-post equilibrium. (See McLean, 1985, 1988; Krishna, 2009 ].)
Unfortunately, the single crossing condition does not generally suffice to obtain optimal social welfare in settings beyond that of a single item auction. It is insufficient even in very simple settings, such as two-item, two-bidder auctions with unit-demand valuations (see Section A), or single-parameter settings with downward-closed feasibility constraints (see Section B).
Moreover, there are many relevant single-item settings where the single-crossing condition does not hold. For example, suppose that the signals indicate demand for a product being auctioned, agents represent firms, and one firm has a stronger signal about demand, but is in a weaker position to take advantage of that demand. A setting like this could yield valuations that do not satisfy the single crossing condition. For a concrete example, consider the following scenario given by Dasgupta and Maskin [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000] .
Example 1.1. Suppose that oil can be sold in the market at a price of 4 dollars per unit and two firms are competing for the right to drill for oil. Firm 1 has a fixed cost of 1 to produce oil and a marginal cost of 2 for each additional unit produced, whereas firm 2 has a fixed cost 2 Except perhaps in degenerate situations. 3 Note that, of course, every ex-post equilibrium is a Bayes-Nash incentive compatible equilibrium, but not necessarily vice versa, and therefore such equilibria are much more robust: they do not depend on knowledge of the priors and bidders need not think about how other bidders might be bidding. This increases our confidence that an ex-post equilibrium is likely to be reached. 4 This implies that given signals s−i, if agent i has the highest value when si = s * , then agent i continues to have the highest value for si > s * . This is precisely the monotonicity needed for ex-post incentive compatibility. of 2 and a marginal cost of 1 for each additional unit produced. In addition, suppose that firm 1 does a private test and discovers that the expected size of the oil reserve is s 1 units. Then v 1 (s 1 , s 2 ) = (4 − 2)s 1 − 1 = 2s 1 − 1, whereas v 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) = (4 − 1)s 1 − 2 = 3s 1 − 2. These valuations don't satisfy the single-crossing condition since firm 1 needs to win when s 1 is low and lose when s 1 is high.
Research Problems
This paper addresses the following two issues related to social welfare maximization in the interdependent values model:
1. To what extent can the optimal social welfare be approximated in interdependent settings that do not satisfy the single-crossing condition?
2. How far beyond the single item setting can we go? Is it possible to approximately maximize social welfare in combinatorial auctions with interdependent values?
The first question was recently considered by Eden et al. [2018] who gave two examples pointing out the difficulty of approximating social welfare without single crossing. Example 1.2 shows that even with two bidders and one signal, there are valuation functions for which no deterministic auction can achieve any bounded approximation ratio to optimal social welfare. 
where H is an arbitrary large number. If A doesn't win when s A = 0, then the approximation ratio is infinite. On the other hand, if A does win when s A = 0, then by monotonicity, A must also win at s A = 1, yielding a 2/H fraction of the optimal social welfare.
The next example can be used to show that there are valuation functions for which no randomized auction performs better (in the worst case) than allocating to a random bidder (i.e., a factor n approximation to social welfare), even if a prior over the signals is known. Example 1.3 (n lower bound for randomized auctions Eden et al. [2018] ). There are n bidders 1, . . . , n that compete over a single item. For every agent i, s i ∈ {0, 1}, and
that is, agent i's value is high if and only if all other agents' signals are high simultaneously. When all signals are 1, then in any feasible allocation, there must be an agent i which is allocated with probability of at most 1/n. By monotonicity, this means that the probability this agent is allocated when the signal profile is s = (1 −i , 0 i ) is at most 1/n as well. Therefore, the achieved welfare at signal profile s is at most 1/n + (n − 1) · , while the optimal welfare is 1, giving a factor n gap 5 .
Therefore, some assumption is needed if we are to get good approximations to social welfare. The approach taken by Eden et al. [2018] was to define a relaxed notion of single-crossing that they called c-single crossing and then provide mechanisms that approximately maximize social welfare, where the approximation ratio depends on c and n, the number of agents.
In this paper, we go in a different direction, starting with the observation that in Example 1.3, the valuations treat the signals as highly-complementary-one has a value bounded away from zero only if all other agent's signals are high simultaneously. This suggests that the case where the valuations treat the signals more like "substitutes" might be easier to handle.
We capture this by focusing on submodular over signals (SOS) valuations. This means that for every i and j, when signals s −j are lower, the sensitivity of the valuation v i (s) to changes in s j is higher. Formally, we assume that for all j, for any s j , δ ≥ 0, and for any s −j and s −j such that
Many valuations considered in the literature on interdependent valuations are SOS (though this term is not used) Milgrom and Weber [1982] ; Dasgupta and Maskin [2000] ; Klemperer [1998] . The simplest (yet still rich) class of SOS valuations are fully separable valuation functions 6 , where there are arbitrary (weakly increasing) functions g ij (s j ) for each pair of bidders i and j such that v i (s) = n j=1 g ij (s j ).
A more general class of SOS valuation functions are functions of the form v i (s) = f ( n j=1 g ij (s j )), where f is a weakly increasing concave function.
We can now state the main question we study in this paper: to what extent can social welfare be approximated in interdependent settings with SOS valuations? Unfortunately, Example 1.2 itself describes SOS valuations, so no deterministic auction can achieve any bounded approximation ratio, even for this subclass of valuations. Thus, we must turn to randomized auctions.
Our Results and Techniques
All of our positive results concern the design of randomized, prior-free, universally ex-post incentivecompatible (IC), individually rational (IR) mechanisms. Prior-free means that the rules of the mechanism makes no use of the prior distribution over the signals, thus need not have any knowledge of the prior.
Our first result provides approximation guarantees for single-parameter downward-closed settings. An important special case of this result is single-item auctions, which was the focus of Eden et al. [2018] .
Theorem 4.1 (See Section 4): For every single-parameter downward-closed setting, if the valuation functions are SOS, then the Random Sampling Vickrey auction is a universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives a 4-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Interestingly, no deterministic mechanism can give better than an (n − 1)-approximation for arbitrary downward-closed settings, even if the valuations are single crossing, and this is tight. Recall that for a single item auction, or even multiple identical items, with single crossing valuations, the deterministic generalized Vickrey auction obtains the optimal welfare Maskin [1992] ; Ausubel et al. [1999] .
We then turn to multi-dimensional settings. In the most general combinatorial auction model that we consider, each agent i has a signal s iT for each subset T of items, and a valuation function v iT := v iT (s 1T , s 2T , . . . , s nT ). For this setting, it is not at all clear under what conditions it might be possible to maximize social welfare in ex-post equilibrium. 7 However, rather surprisingly (see the related work section below), for the case of separable SOS valuations 8 , we are able to extend the 4-approximation guarantee to combinatorial auctions.
Theorem 5.1 (See Section 5): For every combinatorial auction, if the valuation functions are separable-SOS, then the Random Sampling VCG auction is a universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives a 4-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Finally, we consider combinatorial auctions where each agent i has a single-dimensional signal s i , but where the valuation function v iT for each subset of items T is an arbitrary SOS valuation function v iT (s 1 , . . . , s n ). For this case, we show the following: Theorems 6.1 and 6.5 (See Sections 6.1 and 6.2): Consider combinatorial auctions with singledimensional signals, where each signal takes one of k possible values. If the valuation functions are SOS, then there exists a universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives a (k + 3)-approximation to the optimal social welfare. If the valuations are strong-SOS 9 , the approximation ratio improves to O(log k).
All of the above results, as well as our lower bounds, are summarized in Table 1 . In addition, all of the results in this paper generalize easily, with a corresponding degradation in the approximation ratio, to the weaker requirement of d-SOS valuations 10 .
Intuition for results
The fundamental tension in settings with interdependent valuations that is not present in the private values setting is the following. Consider, for example, a single item auction setting where agent 1's truthful report of her signal increases agent 2's value. Since, this increases the chance that agent 2 wins and may decrease agent 1's chance of winning, it might motivate agent 1 to strategize and misreport.
Our approach is to simply prevent this interaction. Without looking at the signals, our mecha-nism randomly divides the agents into two sets 11 : potential winners and certain losers. Losers never receive any allocation. When estimating the value of a potentially winning agent i, we use only the signals of losers and i's own signal(s). Thus, potential winners can not impact the estimated values and hence allocations of other potential winners. This resolves the truthfulness issue. The remaining question is: can we get sufficiently accurate estimates of the agents' values when we ignore so many signals?
The key lemma (Lemma 3.1 Section 3) shows that we can do so, when the valuations are SOS. Specifically, for any agent i, if all agents other than i are split into two random sets A (losers) and B (potential winners), and the signals of agents in the random subset B are "zeroed out", then the expected value agent i has for the item is at least half of her true valuation. That is,
Dealing with combinatorial settings is more involved as the truthfullness characterization is less obvious, but the key ideas of random partitioning and using the signals of certain losers remain at the core of our results.
Additional remarks
While this paper deals entirely with welfare maximization, our results have significance for the objective of maximizing the seller's revenue. Eden et al. [2018] give a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in single-item auctions with SOS valuations. Thus, the constant factor approximation mechanism presented in this paper implies a constant factor approximation to the optimal revenue in single-item auctions with SOS valuations. We note that this is the first revenue approximation result that does not assume any single-crossing type assumption ( [Chawla et al., 2014; Eden et al., 2018; Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016; Li, 2016] require single crossing or approximate single crossing).
Finally, one can easily verify that, based on Yao's min-max theorem, the existence of a randomized prior-free mechanism that gives some approximation guarantee (in expectation over the coin flips of the mechanism) implies the existence of a deterministic prior-dependent mechanisms that gives the same approximation guarantee (in expectation over the signal profiles).
Additional Related Work
As discussed above, in single-parameter settings, there is an extensive literature on mechanism design with interdependent valuations that considers social welfare maximization, revenue maximization and other objectives. However, the vast majority of this literature assumes some kind of single-crossing condition and, in the context of social welfare, focuses on exact optimization.
There are two papers that we are aware of that study the question of how well optimal social welfare can be approximated in ex-post equilibrium without single-crossing. The first is the aforementioned paper [Eden et al., 2018] on single item auctions with interdependent valuations. They defined a parameterized version of single-crossing, termed c-single crossing, where c > 1 is a parameter that indicates how close is the valuation profile to satisfy single-crossing. For c-single crossing valuations, they provide a number of results including a lower bound of c on the approximation ratio achievable by any mechanism, a matching upper bound for binary signal spaces, and mechanisms that achieve approximation ratios of (n − 1)c and 2c 3/2 √ n (the first is deterministic and the second is randomized). Ito and Parkes [2006] also consider approximating social welfare in the interdependent setting. Specifically, they propose a greedy contingent-bid auction (a la [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000] ) and show that it achieves a √ m approximation to the optimal social welfare for m goods, in the special case of combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders.
Beyond that, for multidimensional signals and settings, the landscape is sparser (and bleaker) and, to our knowledge, focuses on exact social welfare maximization. Maskin [1992] has observed that, in general, no efficient incentive-compatible single item auction exists if a buyer's valuation depends on a multi-dimensional signal. Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001a] , building on earlier work of Dasgupta and Maskin [2000] , consider a very general model in which there is a set K of possible alternatives, and a multidimensional signal space, where each agent j has a signal s j ki for each outcome k and other agent j. In their model the valuation function of an agent i for outcome k is linear in the signals, that is, v i (k) := j a j ki s j ki . Thus, their valuation functions are, in one sense, a special case of our separable valuation functions. On the other hand, they are more general in that all quantities depend on the outcome k. Thus, there are allocation externalities. Their main result is that, generically, there is no Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes social welfare in this setting. However, they do give an ex-post IC mechanism that maximizes social welfare with both information and allocation externalities if the signals are one-dimensional, the valuation functions are linear in the signals, and a single-crossing type condition holds.
Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame [2006] go on to show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks with multidimensional signals, interdependent valuations and transferable utilities, are constant functions.
Finally, Bikhchandani [2006] considers a single item setting with multidimensional signals but no allocation externalities and shows that there is a generalization of single-crossing that allows some social choice rules to be implemented ex-post.
For further analysis and discussion of implementation with interdependent valuations, see e.g., Bergemann and Morris [2005] and McLean and Postlewaite [2015] .
Model and Definitions

Single Parameter Settings
In Section 4, we will consider single-parameter settings with interdependent valuations and downwardclosed feasibility constraints. In these settings, a mechanism decides which subset of agents 1, . . . , n are to receive "service" (e.g., an item). The feasibility constraint is defined by a collection I ⊆ 2 [n] of subsets of agents that may feasibly be served simultaneously. We restrict attention to downwardclosed settings, which means that any subset of a feasible set is also feasible. A simple example is a k-item auction, where I is the collection of all subsets of agents of size at most k.
For these settings, we use the interdependent value model of Milgrom and Weber [1982] :
Definition 2.1 (Single Dimensional Signals, Single Parameter Valuations). Each agent j has a private signal s j ∈ R + . The value agent j gives to "receiving service" v j (s) ∈ R + , is a function of all agents' signals s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ). The function v j (s) is assumed to be weakly increasing in each coordinate and strictly increasing in s i .
Deterministic Mechanisms
Definition 2.2 (Deterministic Single Parameter Mechanisms). A deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) in the downward closed setting is a mapping from reported signals s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) to allocations
indicates whether or not agent i receives service and p i (s) is the payment of agent i. It is required that the set of agents that receive service is feasible, i.e., {i | x i (s) = 1} ∈ I. (The mechanism designer knows the form of the valuation functions but learns the private signals only when they are reported.)
Definition 2.3 (Agent utility). Given a deteministic mechanism (x, p), the utility of agent i when her true signal is s i , she reports s i and the other agents report s −i is
Agent i will report s i so as to maximize u i (s i , s −i |s i ). We use u i (s) to denote the utility when she reports truthfully, i.e., u i (s i , s −i |s i ).
Definition 2.4 (Deterministic ex-post incentive compatibility (IC)). A deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) in the interdependent setting is ex-post incentive compatible (IC) if, irrespective of the true signals, and given that all other agents report their true signals, there is no advantage to an agent to report any signal other that her true signal. In other words, assuming that s −i are the true signals of other bidders. u i (s i , s −i |s i ) is maximized by reporting s i truthfully.
Definition 2.5 (Deterministic ex-post individual rationality (IR)). A deterministic mechanism in the interdependent setting is ex-post individually rational (IR) if, irrespective of the true signals, and given that all other agents report their true signals, no agent gets negative utility by participating in the mechanism.
If a deterministic mechanism is both ex-post IR and ex-post IR we say that it is ex-post IC-IR.
Definition 2.6. A deterministic allocation rule x is monotone if for every agent i, every signal profile of all other agents s −i , and every s i ≤ s i , it holds that
Proposition 2.1. [Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016] For every deterministic allocation rule x for single parameter valuations, there exist payments p such that the mechanism (x, p) is ex-post IC-IR if and only if x i is monotone for every agent i.
Randomized Mechanisms
Definition 2.7. A randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms.
Definition 2.8 (Universal ex-post IC-IR). A randomized mechanism is said to be universally expost IC-IR if all deterministic mechanisms in the support are ex-post IC-IR.
Combinatorial Valuations with Interdependent Signals
Sections 5 and 6 focus on combinatorial auctions, where there are n agents and m items. In these settings, a mechanism is used to decide how the items are partitioned among the agents. We consider two models for the interdependent valuations: 12 
In both cases, each v iT (·) is assumed to be a weakly increasing function of each signal and strictly increasing in s i (or s iT respectively), and known to the mechanism designer.
We give subsequent definitions only for multidimensional combinatorial signals, as single dimensional signals can be viewed as a special case of multi-dimensional signals where s iT = s i for all T .
Deterministic Mechanisms
Definition 2.11 (Deterministic mechanisms for combinatorial settings). A deteministic mechanism M = (x, p) is a mapping from reported signals s to allocations x = {x iT } (where each x iT ∈ {0, 1}) and payments p = {p iT } for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and T ⊂ {1, . . . , m} such that:
• Agent j is allocated the set T iff x jT (s) = 1;
• For each agent j, there is at most one T for which x jT (s) = 1;
• The sets allocated to different agents do not intersect.
• The payment for agent j when her allocation is set T is p jT (s).
Definition 2.12 (Agent Utility). The utility of agent i when her signals are s i = {s iT } T ⊂2 m , she reports s i and the other agents report s −i is
Given a mechanism M = (x, p), agent i will report s i so as to maximize u i (s i , s −i |s i ). We use u i (s) to denote the utility when she reports truthfully, i.e., u i (s i , s −i |s i ).
The definitions of ex-post incentive compatibility (IC) and ex-post individually rationality (IR) for deterministic mechanisms for combinatorial settings are the same as the appropriate definitions for single parameter mechanisms (Definitions 2.4 and 2.5 with the obvious modifications).
Randomized Mechanisms
As with single parameter mechanisms, a randomized mechanism for a combinatorial setting is a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms for the combinatorial setting, and a randomized mechanism is said to be universally ex post IC-IR if all deterministic mechanisms in the support are themselves ex-post IC-IR.
Submodularity over signals (SOS)
As discussed in the introduction, our results will rely on an assumption about the valuation functions that we call submodularity over signals or SOS. The SOS (resp. strong-SOS) notion we use is the same as the weak diminishing returns (resp. strong diminishing returns) submodularity notion in [Bian, Levy, Krause, and Buhmann, 2017; Niazadeh, Roughgarden, and Wang, 2018] 13 . SOS was also used in [Eden et al., 2018] , generalizing a similar notion in [Chawla et al., 2014] .
If v satisfies this condition with d = 1, we say that v is an SOS valuation function.
Definition 2.14 (d-approximate strong submodular-over-signals valuations (d-strong-SOS valuations)). The valuation function v(s) is a d strong-SOS valuation if for any j, δ ≥ 0, s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) and s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) such that s is smaller than or equal to s coordinate-wise, it holds that
If v satisfies this condition with d = 1, we say that i's valuation functions are "strong-SOS".
Definition 2.15 (SOS-valuations settings). We say that a mechanism design setting with interdependent valuations is an SOS-valuations setting or, equivalently, that the agents have SOSvaluations, in each of the following cases:
• Single parameter valuations (as in definition 2.1): for every i, the valuation function v i (s) is SOS.
• Combinatorial valuations with single-parameter signals (as in definition 2.9): for every i and T , the valuation function v iT (s) is SOS;
• Combinatorial valuations with multi-parameter signals (as in definition 2.10): for every i and
Similar definitions can be given for d-SOS valuation settings and d-strong-SOS valuation settings.
Finally, in section 5, we will specialize to the case of separable SOS valuations.
Definition 2.16 (Separable SOS valuations). We say that a set of valuations as in Definition 2.10 are separable SOS valuations if for every agent i and subset T of items, v iT (s T ) can be written as
where g −iT (·) and h iT (·) are both weakly increasing and g −iT (s −iT ) is itself an SOS valuation function.
Observation 2.2. A separable SOS valuation function is itself an SOS valuation function.
We can similarly define separable d-SOS valuations.
A useful fact about SOS valuations
Proof. Let i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i |A| be the elements of A. For 1 ≤ j ≤ |A|, let s j and s j denote the vectors
Note that s |A| = (s A + y A , s B ), and s |A| = (s A + y A , s B ). It follows from the d-SOS definition that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ |A|,
where s 0 = (s A , s B ) and s 0 = (s A , s B ). Summing Equation (3) for j = 1, 2, . . . , |A| proves the claim.
The Key Lemma
The following is a key lemma which is used for both single parameter and combinatorial settings. 
where the expectation is over the random choice of A.
Proof. We consider two equiprobable events,
• A = S ⊂ [n] \ {i} is chosen as the random subset.
• A = T = ([n] \ {i}) \ S is chosen as the random subset.
Normalize the valuations so that v i (s) = 1 and define α, β
It follows that
where the first inequality follows from non-negativity of v i (0 S , 0 T , s i ), and the second inequality follows from v i being d-SOS and Lemma 2.3. Similarly, we have that
Solving for equality of the two terms, we get that α = 1/(d + 1) which implies that
Partition the event space into pairs (S, T ) that partition [n] \ {i}. For every such (S, T ) pair, it follows that
. We conclude with the following, where the third line follows from the fact that there are 2 n−1 /2 such (S, T ) pairs that partition [n] \ {i}:
as desired.
Single-Parameter Valuations
In this section we describe the Random Sampling Vickrey (RS-V) mechanism that achieves a 4-approximation for single-parameter downward-closed environments with SOS valuations and a 2(d + 1)-approximation for d-SOS valuations. We then give a lower bound of 2 and √ d for SOS and d-SOS valuations respectively, even in the case of selling a single item.
Let I ⊆ 2 [n] be a downward-closed set system. We present a mechanism that serves only sets in I and gets a 2(d + 1)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Random Sampling Vickrey (RS-V):
• Elicit bidss from the agents.
• Partition the agents into two sets, A and B, uniformly at random.
• Allocate to a set of bidders in
Theorem 4.1. For agents with SOS valuations, and for every downward-closed feasibility constraint I, RS-V is an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives 4-approximation to the optimal welfare. For d-SOS valuations, the mechanism gives a 2(d + 1)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof. We first show the allocation is monotone in one's signal, and hence, by Proposition 2.1, the mechanism is ex-post IC-IR. Fix a random partition (A, B).
• Agents in A are never allocated anything and thus their allocation is weakly monotone in their signal.
• For an agent i ∈ B, increasings i can only increase w i , whereas it leaves w j unchanged for all j ∈ B \ {i}. Thus, this only increases the weight of feasible sets (subsets of B in I) that i belongs to. Therefore, increasing s i can only cause i to go from being unallocated to being allocated.
For approximation, consider a set S * ∈ argmax S∈I i∈S v i (s) that maximizes social welfare. For every i ∈ S * , from the Key Lemma 3.1, we have that
For every set B, the fact that I is downward-closed implies that S * ∩ B ∈ I. Therefore, S * ∩ B is eligible to be selected by RS-V as the allocated set of bidders. We have that the values of the bidders we allocate to are at least
as desired. Since the allocated bidders' true values at s are only higher than the proxy values w i , this continues to hold.
We note that for the case of downward-closed feasibility constraints, even if the valuations satisfy single-crossing, there can be an n − 1 gap between the optimal welfare and the welfare that the best deterministic mechanism can get. This is stated in Theorem B.1 in Section B.
The following lower bounds, Theorem 4.2 show that even for a single item setting, one cannot hope to get a better approximation than 2 and Ω( √ d) for SOS and d-SOS valuations respectively.The lower bounds apply to arbitrary randomized mechanisms 14 .
Theorem 4.2. No ex-post IC-IR mechanism (not necessarily universal) for selling a single item can get a better approximation than (a) a factor of 2 for SOS valuations.
(b) a factor of Ω( √ d) for d-SOS valuations.
Proof. Let x i (s) be the probability agent i is allocated at signal profile s. Notice that for every s, i x i (s) ≤ 1, otherwise the allocation rule is not feasible.
(a) Consider the case where there are two agents, 1 and 2, s 1 ∈ {0, 1} and agent 2 has no signal. The valuations are v 1 (0) = 1, v 1 (1) = 1 + , v 2 (0) = 0 and v 2 (1) = H for H 1 . It is easy to see the valuations are SOS.
In order to get better than a 2-approximation at s 1 = 0, we must have x 1 (0) > 1/2. By monotonicity, this forces x 1 (1) > 1/2 as well, and hence x 2 (1) < 1/2 by feasibility. This implies that the expected welfare when s 1 = 1 is x 1 (1)v 1 (1) + x 2 (1)v 2 (1) < H/2 + 1, while the optimal welfare when s 1 = 1 is H. For a large H, this approaches a 2-approximation. Note that this lower bound applies even given a known prior distribution on the signals in the event that we have a prior on the signals that satisfies: Pr[s 1 = 0] · 1 = Pr[s 1 = 1] · H. 
To see that the valuations are d-SOS, notice that whenever a signal s j changes from 0 to 1, the valuation of agent i = j increases by 1 unless all other signals beside i's are already set to 1, in which case the valuation increases by d − √ d + 2 < d. Consider valuation profiles s i = (0 i , 1 −i ). Note that by monotonicity, for every truthful mechanism, it must be the case that x i (s i ) ≤ x i (1). Since any feasible allocation rule must satisfy √ d i=1 x i (1) ≤ 1, then it must be the case there exists some agent i such that x i (1) ≤ 1 √ d , which by monotonicity implies that 14 A randomized mechanism takes as input the set of signals s and produces as output xi(s) and pi(s) for each agent i, where xi(s) is the probability that agent i wins and pi(s) is agent i's expected payment. Such a mechanism is ex-post IC (but not necessarily universally so) if and only if xi(si, s−i) is monotonically increasing in si.
get that the expected welfare of the mechanism at s i is at most x i (s i )·d+(1−x i (s i ))· √ d ≤ 2 √ d, while the optimal welfare is d. Again, the lower bound also applies to the setting with known priors on the signals using a prior that satisfies: Pr[s i ] = Pr[s j ] = 1 √ d for all i and j.
Combinatorial Auctions with Separable Valuations
In this section we present an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives 1/4 of the optimal social welfare in any combinatorial auction setting with separable SOS valuations (as in Definition 2.16). The mechanism, that we call the Random-sampling VCG auction is a natural extension of the Random-Sampling Vickrey (RS-V) auction presented in Section 4. Note that unlike RS-V, here we need to explicitly define payments so that the obtained mechanism is ex-post IC-IR. We derive VCG-inspired payments which align the objective of the mechanism with that of the agents. Separability is used here, as without it, the payment term would have been affected by the agent's report (while with separability, only the allocation is affected by it).
Random-Sampling VCG (RS-VCG):
• Agents report their signalss.
• Partition the agents into two sets A and B uniformly at random. • Let the allocation be
i.e., {T i } i∈B is the allocation that maximizes the "welfare" using w iT 's.
• Set the payment for a winning agent i ∈ B receiving set of goods T i to be:
that is, w −i is the weight of the best allocation without agent i.
Since the w jT 's do not depend on agent i's report (since i is in B), w −i doesn't depend on agent i's report. Therefore, we can (and will) ignore this term when considering incentive compatibility below. Note also that since the maximal partition guarantees that w −i ≥ j∈B\{i} w jT j , and monotonicity of valuations in signals guarantees that g −iT i (s −i ) ≥ g −iT i (s A , 0 B −i ). Therefore, the payments p i (s) are always nonnegative.
Theorem 5.1. Random-Sampling VCG is an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives a 4-approximation to the optimal social welfare for any combinatorial auction setting with separable SOS valuations.
Proof. First we show that if the agents bid truthfully, then the mechanism gives a 4-approximation to social welfare. For every agent i and bundle T ,
where the inequality follows by applying Lemma 3.1 with d = 1. Let S * 1 , . . . , S * n be the true welfare maximizing allocation. Then,
where the last inequality follows by substituting S * i in T in Equation (5) for every i. Since v iT (s) is always at least w iT , this proves the approximation ratio.
Next, we show that RS-VCG is universally ex-post IC. Fix a random partition (A, B) . Suppose that when all agents bid truthfully
Suppose that all agents but i ∈ B bid truthfully and i bids s i instead of his true signal vector s i . Let {T j } j∈B be the resulting allocation. Therefore, agent i's utility when reporting s i (after disregarding the w −i term as mentioned above) is:
where j∈B w jT * j is i's utility for bidding truthfully. Finally, we show that the mechanism is ex-post IR. Indeed, from above, agent i's utility when reporting truthfully (and without disregarding the
In the case of separable d-SOS valuations, the Random-Sampling VCG is an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives 2(d + 1)-approximation to the social welfare. The proof is identical to Theorem 5.1, except that Equation (5) is changed to
since we apply Lemma 3.1 with an arbitrary d.
Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.1 is clearly analogous to the VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions with private values. As with VCG for private values, in many cases, there is unlikely to be a polynomial time algorithm to compute allocations and payments. Exceptions include settings we know and love such as unit-demand auctions, additive valuations, etc.
Combinatorial Auctions with Single-Dimensional Signals
In this section we consider combinatorial valuations (general combinatorial auctions) with singledimensional signals (as given by Definition 2.9). When the signal space of each agent is of size at most k, we present a mechanism that gets (k+3)-approximation for SOS valuations (see Section 6.1), and a mechanism that gets (2 log 2 k+4)approximation for strong-SOS valuations (Definition 2.14, see Section 6.2 for details regarding the mechanism). For d-SOS and d-strong-SOS valuations, the mechanism generalizes to give O(dk)and O(d 2 log k)-approximations respectively, as shown in Section C.
We first decompose the optimal welfare into two parts, OTHER and SELF. Each part will be covered by a corresponding mechanism. Let T * = {T * i } i∈[n] be a welfare-maximizing allocation at signal profile s, and let W * (s) be the social welfare of T * at s. Consider the following decomposition:
where Equation (6) follows from the definition of submodularity (and therefore, also follows the definition of strong-submodularity). The last inequality follows from the non-negativity of v iT * i (0). The first term in the decomposition represents the contribution of others' signals to one's value from his allocated bundle, while the second term represents one's contribution to his own value. Each of these terms will be targeted using a different mechanism. Whereas the OTHER term will be targeted using the same mechanism in both the SOS and strong-SOS cases, the SELF term will be treated differently.
(k + 3)-approximation for SOS valuations
Suppose s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} for all i. The mechanism is as follows:
Mechanism k signals High-Low (k-HL): With probability p RT = k−1 k+3 , run Random Threshold; otherwise, run Random Sampling, as described below: Mechanism Random Threshold
• Choose a random threshold uniformly in {1, . . . , k − 1}.
• Let N ≥ = {i : s i ≥ } be the "high" agents; i.e., agents with signal at least , and let N < = [n] \ N ≥ be the "low" agents.
• For every high agent i ∈ N ≥ and bundle T ,
• For every low agent i ∈ N < and bundle T , letv iT := 0.
• Let the allocation beT
(i.e., the allocation that maximizes the "welfare" of high agents using valuesv iT .)
Mechanism Random Sampling
• Split the agents into sets A and B uniformly at random.
• For each i ∈ B and bundle T , letṽ iT := v ij (s A , 0 B ).
• For each i ∈ A and bundle T , letṽ iT := 0.
• Let the allocation beT ∈ argmax S={S i } i∈B i∈Bṽ iS i .
(i.e., the allocation that maximizes the "welfare" of agents in B using valuesṽ iT .)
• Charge no payments.
The k-HL mechanism is a random combination of two mechanisms: Random Threshold approximates the welfare contribution of the bidders' signals to their own value (the SELF term); Random Sampling approximates the welfare contributions of the bidders' signals to other bidders' values (the OTHER term). We wish to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. For every combinatorial auction setting with SOS valuations, single-dimensional signals, and signal space of size k, i.e. s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k −1} ∀i, mechanism k-HL is an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives (k + 3)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
We first argue that the mechanism is ex-post IC-IR.
Proof of ex-post IC-IR. Random Sampling is ex-post IC-IR since the agents that might receive items (agents in B) cannot change the allocation since their signals are ignored (and they pay nothing).
As for Random Threshold, consider a threshold chosen by the mechanism. If the agent's signal is below and the agent reports or above, then his payment, if allocated bundle T is v iT (s −i , s i = − 1) ≥ v iT (s); i.e., the agent's utility is non-positive. Bidding a different value below will grant the agent no items. If his value is or above, then bidding a different signal above will result in the same outcome, since the sets N ≥ and N < remain the same. If he bids a signal below , then he won't receive any item, and his utility will be 0, while bidding his true signal will result in non-negative utility.
In Lemma 6.3, we prove that Random Sampling covers the OTHER component of the social welfare, and in Lemma 6.2, we show that Random Threshold covers the SELF component. Lemma 6.2. For SOS valuations, the Random Threshold mechanism gives a (k−1)-approximation to the SELF component of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider a threshold ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} chosen in Random Threshold. Whenever is chosen, we have that
Since Random Threshold chooses an allocationT = {T i } i∈N ≥ that maximizes the welfare under v iT 's, the value of the allocation is only larger than the left expression above. Because v iT i (s) ≥v iT i , we get that if was chosen, which happens with probability 1 k−1 , the welfare achieved is at least
. Therefore, the welfare from running Random Threshold is at least
Lemma 6.3. For SOS valuations, the Random Sampling mechanism gives a 4-approximation to the OTHER component of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider a set T . Using an application of the Key Lemma 3.1 with respect to v iT (s −i , 0 i ), we see that
Therefore, the expected weight of the allocation {T * i } i∈[n] using weightsṽ iT 's is
Since the mechanism chooses the optimal allocation according to theṽ iT 's, its weight can only be larger. Moreover, sinceṽ iT = v iT (s −i , 0) ≤ v iT (s), the welfare achieved by the mechanism is at least OTHER 4 , as desired.
We conclude by proving the claimed approximation ratio.
Proof of approximation. According to Lemma 6.2, Random Threshold approximates SELF to a factor of k − 1. According to Lemma 6.3 that Random Sampling approximates OTHER to a factor of 4. Therefore, running Random Threshold with probability p RT and Random Sampling with probability 1 − p RT yields a welfare of
where the inequality follows Equation (7).
O(log k)-Approximation with Strong-SOS Valuations
Strong-SOS valuations means the effect on the valuation is concave in one's own signal. This allows us to use a bucketing technique in order to give an O(log k)-approximation to the SELF component in the decomposition depicted by Equation (7). Consider the SELF term in Equation (7). We can bound this term as follows:
where the inequality follows the definition of strong-SOS valuations. We introduce mechanism Random Bucket to give an O(log k)-approximation to the upper bound in Equation (9).
Mechanism Random Bucket:
• choose uniformly in {1, . . . , log 2 k}.
• Let N B = {i : such that s i ≥ 2 −1 } be the agents with signal at least 2 −1 and N ¬B = [n] \ N B .
• For i ∈ N B and bundle T , letv iT := v iT (s N ¬B , 2 −1 N B ) (andv iT := 0 for i ∈ N ¬B ).
• Agent i that receives bundleT i pays v iT i (s −i , s i = 2 −1 − 1).
We show the following approximation guarantee regarding Random Bucket.
Lemma 6.4. For strong-SOS valuations, the Random Bucket mechanism is ex-post IC-IR and gives a 2 log 2 k approximation to the SELF component of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. The proof of ex-post IC-IR is identical to that of mechanism Random Threshold, as both are threshold-based mechanisms. The proof of the approximation guarantee is also very similar to that of Random Threshold. Consider a threshold 2 −1 for ∈ {1, . . . , k−1} chosen in Random Bucket. Whenever is chosen, we have that
Since Random Bucket chooses an allocation that maximizes thev iT 's, the value of the allocation is only larger. Because v iT i (s) ≥v iT i , we get that if was chosen, which happens with probability 1 log 2 k , the welfare achieved is at least
. Therefore, the welfare from running Random Bucket is at least
Mechanism k-signals Strong-SOS (k-SS) runs Random Bucket with probability p RB = log 2 k log 2 k+2
and mechanism Random Sampling with probability 1 − p RB .
Theorem 6.5. For every combinatorial auction with single-dimensional signals with strong-SOS valuations and signal space of size k, i.e. s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k −1} ∀i, mechanism k-SS is ex-post IC-IR, and gives (2 log 2 k + 4)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. We already established that both Random Bucket and Random Sampling are ex-post IC-IR, hence k-SS is ex-post IC-IR as well. As for the approximation, according to Lemma 6.4, with probability p RB we get 2 log 2 k-approximation to SELF, and according to Lemma 6.3, with probability 1 − p RB we get a 4-approximation to OTHER. Overall, the expected welfare is at least
Open Problems
Our analysis and results suggest many open problems:
• For combinatorial auctions with multi-dimensional signals: is separability a necessary condition for achieving constant approximation to welfare? This problem is open even for singledimensional signals, and even for "simple" combinatorial valuations, such as unit-demand.
• For single-parameter SOS valuations, downward closed feasibility, and single-dimensional signals, closing the gap between 1/4 and 1/2 is open.
• The exact same gap applies for combinatorial, separable-SOS valuations with multi-dimensional signals.
• How does the distinction between SOS and strong-SOS affect the problems above, if at all?
• When considering the relaxation of SOS valuations to d-SOS valuations, there is a gap between the positive and negative results with respect to the dependence on d. 
A Unit-Demand Valuations with Single-Crossing
Whereas single-crossing is a strong enough condition to implement the fully efficient mechanism in a variety of single-parameter environment, generalizations of this condition fail even in the simplest multi-parameter environments. We consider the case where bidders are unit demand and each bidder has a scalar as a signal. We define single-crossing for this setting as follows.
Definition A.1 (Single-crossing for unit-demand valuations). A valuation profile v is said to be single crossing if for every agent i, signals s −i , item j and agent ,
In this section, we show that in the case two non-identical items are for sale, and the valuations are unit demand and satisfy single-crossing as defined in Equation (10), any truthful mechanism is bounded away from achieving full efficiency.
In order to give the lower bound, we first give a characterization of ex-post IC and IR mechanisms in multi-dimensional environments in interdependent values settings (Section A.1). We then turn to prove the lower bound (Section A.2).
A.1 Cycle Monotonicity
In the IPV model, Rochet [1987] introduced cycle monotonicity as a necessary and sufficient condition on the allocation to be implementable in dominant strategies (DSIC) for multidimensional environments. It was noticed that a straightforward analogue holds for the IDV value model, for ex-post implementability (EPIC) (in Vohra [2007] , this fact is stated without a proof).
Fix a feasible allocation rule x = {x i } i∈ [n] , where x iT (s) is the probability agent i receives a bundle T under bid profile s. For each agent i, consider the graph G x i where there is a vertex for each signal profile s, and there is a directed edge from s to t if
x iT (t)v iT (s).
The following theorem states that a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post implementability of x is that for every agent i, every directed cycle in G x i is non-negative. The proof is a straightforward adjustment of the original proof in Rochet [1987] , and is given below for completeness.
Theorem A.1. The allocation rule x is implementable by an ex-post IC mechanism if and only if for every agent i, all directed cycles in G x i have non-negative weight.
Proof. We first show that if the allocation rule is implementable, then there are no negative cycles. Fix some payment rule p = {p i } i∈ [n] , where p i (s) is the payment of agent i under bid profile s. Let s −i be the real signals of all bidders except i, and consider a cycle Since (x, p) is an ex-post IC mechanism, for every true signal s i = s, agent i is at least as well off bidding s than any other bid s . We get that
. . .
Summing over the above inequalities and using the convention that + 1 = 1, we get that
where the LHS of the last inequality is exactly the weight of the cycle. We now show how to compute payments that implement a given allocation rule x that induces no negative cycles for any i and G x i . Given G x i , one can compute payments as follows.
• Add a dummy node d with edges of weight 0 to all nodes in G x i .
• For every node s of G x i , let δ(s) be the distance of the shortest path from d to s. 
as desired. Figure 1 : An instance with unit-demand single-crossing valuations where no deterministic truthful allocation achieves more than a half of the optimal welfare.
A.2 Lower Bounds for Deterministic and Randomized Mechanisms
Lemma A.2. There exists a setting with two items and two agents with unit-demand and single crossing valuations, such that no deterministic truthful mechanism achieves more than 1/2 of the optimal welfare.
Proof. Consider the setting depicted in Figure 1 , with two agents, 1 and 2, and two items, a and b. s 1 ∈ {0, 1} and s 2 is fixed. The values at
for some arbitrarily large H and a sufficiently small . One can easily verify that the valuations satisfy Equation (10), and hence single crossing; indeed, when agent 1's signal increases, the valuation of agent 1 for each one of the item increases by more than the change in agent 2's valuation. We show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can get better than 2-approximation. In order to get better than 2-approximation, the mechanism must allocate item a to agent 1 and item b to bidder 2 at signal s 1 = 0. At s 1 = 1, allocating item b to agent 1 and item a to agent 2 obtains a welfare of 2H, while any other allocation obtains at most a welfare of H + 2 + . Since H can be arbitrarily large, one must allocate item b to agent 1 and item a to agent 2 at signal s 1 = 1 in order to get an approximation ratio better than 2. Consider such an allocation rule x, and the graph G x 1 . This graph has one cycle, with one edge from s 1 = 0 to s 1 = 1 and one edge from s 1 = 1 to s 1 = 0. The weight of this cycle is
Based on Theorem A.1, this implies that this allocation rule is not implementable Lemma A.3. There exists a setting with two items and two agents with unit-demand and single crossing valuations, such that no randomized truthful mechanism achieves more than 
for an arbitrarily large H. One can easily verify that the valuations are single crossing. We claim that the following equalities hold with respect to the allocation rule of the optimal randomized mechanism:
(a) For every s 1 , s 2 , x 1a (s 1 , s 2 ) = x 2b (s 2 , s 1 ) and x 2a (s 1 , s 2 ) = x 1b (s 2 , s 1 ).
(b) For some q ∈ [0, 1], x 1a (0, 0) = x 2b (0, 0) = q and x 1∅ (0, 0) = x 2∅ (0, 0) = 1 − q.
(c) For some p ∈ [0, 1], x 1a (0, 1) = p and x 1b (0, 1) = 1 − p.
We next prove the above equalities.
(a) Consider some implementable allocation rulex, and consider the allocation rulex wherẽ x 1a (s 1 , s 2 ) =x 2b (s 2 , s 1 ) andx 2a (s 1 , s 2 ) =x 1b (s 2 , s 1 ) for every s 1 , s 2 . Note that the valuations are symmetric; i.e., the role of item a (resp. b) for agent 1 is the same as the role of items b (resp. a) for agent 2. By symmetry,x is implementable if and only ifx is implementable, and both allocation rules have the same approximation guarantee. Clearly, an allocation rule x that applies allocation rulesx andx, with probability 1 2 each, maintains the same approximation guarantee. Moreover, this allocation rule satisfies the desired property.
(b) The optimal mechanism gains nothing from assigning any positive probability for allocating item b to agent 1 under signal profile (0, 0). This is because item b grants no value to agent 1, and in terms of incentives, it can only incentivize agent 1 to misreport his signal at signal profile (1, 0). Analogously, the optimal mechanism gains nothing from assigning any positive probability for allocating item a to agent 2 under signal profile (0, 0). By (a), x 1a (0, 0) = x 2b (0, 0) = q for some q ∈ [0, 1]. To conclude the proof of (b), note that the only other feasible set for the agents is the empty set (otherwise, agent 1 has some probability to get item b and agent 2 has some probability to get item a).
(c) Consider G x 1 and the cycle C = (0, 0) → (1, 0) → (0, 0) in G x 1 . This is the only cycle that contains the node (1, 0) in G x 1 . Assume x 1∅ (1, 0) > 0. Transferring z ∈ (0, 1] probability from x 1∅ (1, 0) to x 1a (1, 0) decreases the weight of the edge (0, 0) → (1, 0) by z, and increases the weight of the edge (1, 0) → (0, 0) by z(1 + √ 2H) > z. Therefore, its net effect on the weight of C is positive. Transferring z ∈ (0, 1] probability from x 1∅ (1, 0) to x 1b (1, 0) does not affect the weight of the edge (0, 0) → (1, 0), and increases the weight of the edge (1, 0) → (0, 0) by zH. Therefore, its net effect on the weight of C is positive. Since transferring x 1∅ (1, 0) to x 1a (1, 0) and x 1b (1, 0) increases welfare and does not violate cycle monotonicity, the optimal mechanism clearly assigns no probability to x 1∅ (1, 0). Now assume x 1{a,b} (1, 0) > 0. By Moving this probability to x 1a (1, 0), we get the same expected welfare at (1, 0), and the weight of the edges in C does not change. Therefore, we may also assume the mechanism does not assign positive utility to x 1{a,b} (1, 0).
According to Theorem A.1, in any truthful mechanism, the weight of the cycle C must be non-negative . This translates to the following condition.
In the optimal mechanism, q will be as large as possible in order to maximize the expected welfare at signal profile (0, 0). Hence, we can assume q = p 1 − 1 √ 2 + 1 √ 2 . Therefore, the approximation ratio at profile (0, 0) is at most q = p 1 − 1 √ 2 + 1 √ 2 . At profile (0, 1), if item a is allocated to agent 1 (which happens with probability p), the welfare of the mechanism is at most 2 + √ 2H, while the welfare of the optimal allocation is 2H. As H can be arbitrarily large, this approximation ratio tends to 1 √ 2 . Therefore, the approximation ratio at profile (1, 0) is at most p √ 2 + (1 − p) = 1 − p 1 − 1 √ 2 . The optimal mechanism would balance between the approximation ratio at (0, 0) and at (1, 0), therefore uses p that solves
Solving for p, we get p = 1 2 . This leads to an approximation ratio of at most 2+ √ 2 4 , as promised.
B n − 1 Lower Bound for Deterministic Mechanisms with Single-Crossing SOS Valuations.
We show that for downward-closed environments, even if valuations satisfy a single-crossing condition and are SOS, any deterministic mechanism cannot obtain a better approximation to the optimal welfare than n − 1.
Theorem B.1. There exists a downward-closed environment with valuations that satisfy singlecrossing for which no deterministic mechanism more than a n − 1 fraction of the optimal welfare.
Proof for an arbitrary large value H 1. Once can easily verify these valuations satisfy single-crossing and SOS. Any deterministic mechanism that wants to get any approximation to the social welfare must allocate to agent 1 when s 1 = 0. In addition, if a deterministic mechanism wants to get a better approximation than n − 1 to the optimal social welfare, agent 1 cannot be allocated when s 1 = 1. Otherwise, none of the bidders in {2, . . . n} can get allocated because the only set in I that contains agent 1 is the singleton set. Therefore, if agent 1 is allocated at s 1 = 1, the achieved welfare is 1 + H, whereas the optimal welfare is (n − 1) · H (when serving all agents in {2, . . . , n}). For an arbitrary large H This ratio approaches n − 1.
The proof follows since serving agent 1 at s 1 = 0 and not serving agent 1 at s 1 = 1 is violates monotonicity.
Remark B.2. The n−1 factor is tight for single-crossing valuations. If [n] ∈ I, then the mechanism an always allocate all agents. Otherwise, one can always allocate only to the highest valued agent, which is monotone because of single crossing. Since the largest feasible set is of size at most n − 1 in this case, allocating to the highest valued agent yields an approximation ratio of n − 1.
C Results for d-SOS
We now extend the results in Section 6 to the case of combinatorial d-SOS and combinatorial d-strong-SOS valuations with single-dimensional signals. We first note that if we consider d-SOS valuations, then Equation (6) in the decomposition becomes
We now show the extension of Theorem 6.1 to d-SOS valuations.
Theorem C.1. For every combinatorial auction with d-SOS valuations over single-dimensional signals, and signal space of size k, i.e., s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} ∀i, there exists a truthful mechanism that gives d(k + 1) + 2-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. The mechanism is identical to k-HL, but runs (Random Threshold) with probability p RT = (k−1)d d(k+1)+2 and (Random Sampling) With probability 1 − p RT . The mechanism was already proved to be truthful in Section 6.1.
Random Threshold now gives a d(k − 1)-approximation to the new SELF term. The proof is the same as of Lemma 6.2, but the extra factor of d comes from the fact the the new SELF term is d times larger.
Random Sampling gives a 2(d + 1)-approximation to the OTHER term. While this term is the same for d-SOS, the new factor is due to the fact that when applying Lemma 3.1 in the proof of Lemma 6.3, we get that E A,B [ṽ iT ] ≥ 1 2(d+1) v iT (s −i , 0 i ) instead of the bound we get in Equation (8). The new approximation guarantee follows from the new decomposition, the new approximation guarantees the various mechanisms get for the terms of the decomposition, and the updated probability p RT .
We next extend Theorem 6.5.
Theorem C.2. For every combinatorial auction with d-strong-SOS valuations over single-dimensional signals, and signal space of size k, i.e., s i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} ∀i, there exists a truthful mechanism that gives (d(d + 1) log 2 k + 2(d + 1))-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. The mechanism is identical to mechanism k-SS from Section 6.2, but runs Random Bucket with probability p RB = d log 2 k d log 2 k+2 and (Random Sampling) With probability 1 − p RB . The SELF term from Equation (9) is now bounded via the following:
where the inequality follows the definition of d-strong-SOS valuations.
The new bound changes the guarantee of Random Bucket to get a d(d + 1) log 2 k-approximation to the SELF term, where the proof is identical to that of Lemma 6.4.
As stated in Theorem C.1, Random Sampling approximates the OTHER term to a factor 2(d+1). The proof of the new bound follows the new decomposition, the updated probabilities and the new approximation guarantees of the mechanisms being run.
